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Cross-examination is fundamental to the adversarial criminal trial. However, when 
children and witnesses with an intellectual disability are cross-examined, it can lead to 
unreliable evidence and further trauma to the victim. Various reforms in Australian 
jurisdictions, England and elsewhere have had only limited practical e!ect as they fail to 
address the underlying problems that arise from the adversarial system itself. While any 
changes must maintain a defendant’s vital right to a fair trial, the current criminal trial 
may allow defendants an illegitimate advantage. Fairness to the defendant, victim and 
society can and must be balanced. In order to reduce any illegitimate advantage, direct 
cross-examination should be removed. Instead, cross-examination should be conducted in 
advance of trial by a suitable third party and video-recorded. A similar process is used in 
Norway. A wholesale transformation into an inquisitorial system is not required for the 
bene(ts of non-adversarial examination to be achieved. 
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I   INTRODUCTION  
Cross-examination is a hallmark of the adversarial system. A defence lawyer, 
when cross-examining, aims to strengthen the defence’s argument and 
discredit the witnesses’ testimony.1 However, when the witness is a child or 
person with an intellectual disability, cross-examination can jeopardise the 
chance of both the truth emerging and ensuring that justice is done. It is well-
established that the cross-examination of children and persons with an 
intellectual disability can cause them to give unreliable evidence.2 ;is may be 
because, for example, children have particular di8culties remembering what 
 
 1 James Lindsay Glissan, Cross-Examination Practice and Procedure: An Australian Perspective 
(Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1991) 73–4. 
 2 See generally Adrian Keane, ‘Cross-Examination of Vulnerable Witnesses: Towards a 
Blueprint for Re-Professionalism’ (2012) 16 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 175, 
176–80. 
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happened a long time a<er the event;3 may not realise they have misunder-
stood a question;4 may not seek clariMcation of confusing, complex or 
ambiguous questions;5 and may be prone to anxiety.6 Similar problems can be 
experienced by witnesses who have an intellectual disability.7 
;e discussion in this article is conMned to witnesses who are either chil-
dren8 or have an intellectual disability9 and are capable of giving evidence in 
criminal proceedings.10 ;ough there are other classes of vulnerable witnesses 
 
 3 Judge Kevin Sleight, ‘Managing Trials for Sexual O=ences — A Western Australian 
Perspective’ (Paper presented at the AIJA Criminal Justice in Australia and New Zealand — 
Issues and Challenges for Judicial Administration Conference, Sydney, 7–9 September 2011) 
17. Cf Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (‘AIJA’), Bench Book for Children 
Giving Evidence in Australian Courts (2012) 31. 
 4 Emma Davies, Emily Henderson and Kirsten Hanna, ‘Facilitating Children to Give Best 
Evidence: Are ;ere Better Ways to Challenge Children’s Testimony?’ (2010) 34 Criminal 
Law Journal 347, 352. 
 5 Rachel Zajac, Julien Gross and Harlene Hayne, ‘Asked and Answered: Questioning Children 
in the Courtroom’ (2003) 10 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 199, 207. 
 6 AIJA, Bench Book, above n 3, 16; Judge Sleight, above n 3, 18. 
 7 See generally Mark R Kebbell, Christopher Hatton and Shane D Johnson, ‘Witnesses With 
Intellectual Disability in Court: What Questions are Asked and What InRuence Do ;ey 
Have?’ (2004) 9 Legal and Criminological Psychology 23, 25–6, 31–3; Janine Benedet and 
Isabel Grant, ‘Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for Witnesses with Mental Disabilities in 
Sexual Assault Cases’ (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 12–17. 
 8 ;e deMnition of ‘children’ in the vulnerable witness context varies depending on jurisdiction 
and provision. For instance, in Victoria, it is a person under 18 years of age (Evidence Act 
2008 (Vic) s 41(4)), while in South Australia it is a person under 16 years of age (Evidence Act 
1929 (SA) s 4 (deMnition of ‘vulnerable witness’ para (a))). However, these deMnitional dis-
tinctions are not important for the general purpose of this article. 
 9 ;e deMnition in the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) sch 3 of a ‘person with an impairment of the 
mind’ encapsulates the sense in which the terms ‘intellectual disability’, ‘cognitive impair-
ment’ and ‘intellectual impairment’ are to be understood in this article:  
a person with a disability that (a) is attributable to an intellectual, psychiatric, cognitive or 
neurological impairment or a combination of these; and (b) results in (i) a substantial re-
duction of the person’s capacity for communication, social interaction or learning; and 
(ii) the person needing support. 
  However, the authors acknowledge that no single term commands universal acceptance and a 
variety of terms can be used to describe this category of witness: see, eg, Glynis H Murphy 
and Isabel C H Clare, ‘;e E=ect of Learning Disabilities on Witness Testimony’ in Anthony 
Heaton-Armstrong et al (eds), Witness Testimony: Psychological, Investigative and Evidential 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2006) 43, 44. 
 10 ;is article does not cover witnesses deemed ‘incompetent’ to give evidence. Children and 
witnesses with an intellectual disability are required to demonstrate an understanding of the 
terms ‘truth’ and ‘oath’ to be considered competent to testify. ;is threshold has been criti-
cised: see, eg, Nicholas Bala et al, ‘;e Competence of Children to Testify: Psychological 
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who may also be unfairly disadvantaged in the trial process, such as adult 
victims of sexual assault,11 it is clear that particular problems arise in the 
cross-examination of children and persons with an intellectual disability. 
Although the existing literature usually deals either with children or persons 
with an intellectual disability, this article discusses them together due to the 
similar di8culties they face in giving evidence. ;is approach is consistent 
with how various Australian jurisdictions deMne ‘vulnerable witnesses’ to 
include both young children and those with an intellectual disability.12 In 
Part II, the context to the issues raised in this article will be discussed. In 
Part III, the factors that may give rise to a reduced quality of evidence will be 
addressed. ;ese factors include the nature of the adversarial system, defence 
counsel’s duty to represent their client vigorously, the phrasing and language 
of questions, and the delay between complaint and cross-examination. In 
Part IV, the concept and requirements of a fair trial will be analysed. ;is 
includes examining the right to a fair trial under both the common law and 
international human rights conventions. Whilst a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial is fundamental, the concept of a fair trial extends beyond the interests of 
the defendant to those of witnesses and society. It is contended that the 
current adversarial status quo provides defendants with an unfair advantage 
that may compromise society’s legitimate right to bring o=enders to justice. 
Accordingly, the need for a wider view of fairness is also considered. 
Measures suggested by commentators13 or used in other jurisdictions are 
discussed and evaluated in Part V. Proposed reforms are examined in the 
wider context of both investigatory and trial procedures, as reforms to trials 
cannot be considered in isolation of other criminal justice processes. A range 
of measures have been adopted or proposed in various jurisdictions in recent 
years to improve the position of vulnerable witnesses and enable them to give 
better quality evidence, however, problems in cross-examination persist. 
 
Research Informing Canadian Law Reform’ (2010) 18 International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 53. 
 11 See New South Wales Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’), Questioning of Complainants 
by Unrepresented Accused in Sexual O!ence Trials, Report No 101 (2003) 10 [2.2]. 
 12 See, eg, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 306M (deMnition of ‘vulnerable person’); 
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 4 (deMnition of ‘vulnerable witness’); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) 
s 41(4). 
 13 See, eg, J R Spencer, ‘Conclusions’ in John R Spencer and Michael E Lamb (eds), Children 
and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? (Hart Publishing, 2012) 171; David Caru-
so, ‘“I Don’t Want to Play Follow the Leader”: Reforms for the Cross-Examination of Child 
Witnesses and the Reception and Treatment of their Evidence — Part 2’ (Paper presented at 
the AIJA Criminal Justice in Australia and New Zealand — Issues and Challenges for Judicial 
Administration Conference, Sydney, 9 September 2011). 
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Many of these measures, although well-intentioned, have had limited practical 
e=ect because they fail to address the underlying problems that arise from the 
adversarial system itself.14  
;is article endorses the view that more fundamental reform is neces-
sary.15 SpeciMcally, it argues that a regime should be implemented in all 
Australian jurisdictions for the questioning of children and witnesses with 
intellectual disability that entrusts this task to an independent interviewer 
with specialist qualiMcations in questioning such witnesses. ;e model 
advocated here is based on those in operation in Norway. In their important 
and wide ranging works on alternative models for eliciting evidence from 
children in criminal trials, Cossins,16 and Hanna, Davies, Henderson, 
Crothers and Rotherham17 have argued for the employment in Australia and 
New Zealand of specialist intermediaries to conduct the questioning of 
children at trial along the lines of models in place in a number of inquisitorial 
systems. However, Cossins’ preferred approach does not involve delegating 
primary responsibility for both devising and conducting the questioning to 
the intermediary. Rather, she envisages the intermediary having a quasi-
interpretive role, conducting the questioning on behalf of defence counsel 
using age appropriate language and pre-prepared questions, and ensuring that 
the questioning is devoid of many adversarial features that might detract from 
 
 14 See, eg, in relation to children, Christine Eastwood and Wendy Patton, ‘;e Experiences of 
Child Complainants of Sexual Abuse in the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2002) 32–4; David Caruso and Timothy Cross, ‘;e 
Case in Australia for Further Reform to the Cross-Examination and Court Management of 
Child Witnesses’ (2012) 16 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 364. 
 15 See also fundamental reform recommendations made by Caruso and Cross, above n 14,  
394–7; Annie Cossins, ‘Cross-Examination in Child Sexual Assualt Trials: Evidentiary Safe-
guard or an Opportunity to Confuse?’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 68, 101–4; 
Annie Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex O=ences in Australia’ (Report, 
National Child Sexual Assault Reform Committee, March 2010) 273–7 [4.119]–[4.136], 335 
[6.87]–[6.89]; Annie Cossins, ‘Cross-Examining the Child Complainant: Rights, Innovations 
and Unfounded Fears in the Australian Context’ in John R Spencer and Michael E Lamb 
(eds), Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? (Hart Publishing, 2012) 95, 
107–11; Kirsten Hanna et al, ‘Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Re-
view of Practice and Implications for Policy’ (Report, Institute of Public Policy, AUT Univer-
sity, 2010) 176–7; Emily Henderson, ‘Alternative Routes: Other Accusatorial Jurisdictions on 
the Slow Road to Best Evidence’ in John R Spencer and Michael E Lamb (eds), Children and 
Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? (Hart Publishing, 2012) 43. 
 16 Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex O=ences in Australia’, above n 15, 
275–7 [4.129]–[4.133], 332–5 [6.74]–[6.89]. 
 17 Hanna et al, above n 15, 11, 166–7. 
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the reliability of the testimony.18 While Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers 
and Rotherham view the development of a specialist interviewing service (in 
combination with pre-recorded interview) as a ‘natural next goal’ for the New 
Zealand criminal justice system, they also regard it as an ‘ambitious’ one.19 
It is the central argument of this article that the limitations of measures 
enacted to date to ameliorate the problems facing children and witnesses with 
intellectual disability in testifying justiMes root and branch reform of a kind 
argued for by Cossins, and Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers and Rother-
ham. However, this article adopts a slightly more strenuous stance than these 
reports, albeit while ‘standing on their shoulders’. It maintains that a model 
that departs as little as possible from those operating in countries like Norway 
should be implemented in Australia. Specialist questioners should have 
independent responsibility for conducting the examination of children  
and witnesses with intellectual disabilities, with counsel having the opportuni-
ty to request lines of and matters for questioning but taking no direct role  
in questioning or devising the precise questions to be asked. ;is model  
o=ers the greatest potential for delivering to children and witnesses with 
intellectual disabilities the possibility to participate e=ectively and equally in 
criminal trials. 
Recent revelations about the extensive abuse of children and people with 
intellectual disabilities, by those entrusted with their care,20 make it necessary 
to re-examine the barriers to obtaining justice faced by vulnerable witnesses 
and to reconsider the steps taken to date to ameliorate these problems. ;e 
tragic results of the entrenched failure of our criminal justice process to 
protect vulnerable people from abuse and bring their abusers to justice 
demonstrates that we have been too tentative in implementing measures to 
improve their situation, too wary of fundamental change, and that we have 
delayed too long in making recommended di8cult reforms. 
 
 18 Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex O=ences in Australia’, above n 15, 
275–7 [4.129]–[4.133], 332–5 [6.74]–[6.89], 336 [6.91]. 
 19 Hanna et al, above n 15, 176. 
 20 See, eg, Jason Gordon, ‘Sex Abuse Going On a Long Time: Inquiry Expects to Hear of Cover-
ups’, ?e Newcastle Herald (Newcastle), 2 July 2013, 8; Phillip Coorey and Josephine Tovey, 
‘Gillard Acts on Sex Abuse Claims’, ?e Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 13 November 
2012, 1; Josh Gordon and Barney Zwartz, ‘Church Inquiry “Not Enough”: Parliament to 
Investigate Abuse — We’re Not Right For Job, Says MP’, ?e Age (Melbourne), 18 April 2012, 
1; South Australia, Royal Commission, Report of Independent Education Inquiry (2012–13); 
Janine Dillon ‘Violence Against People with Cognitive Impairment’ (Report, O8ce of the 
Public Advocate, August 2010). 
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One of the major fetters on root and branch reform of the kind endorsed 
in this article has been concern that it would compromise defendants’ right to 
a fair trial. While it is widely accepted that the rights and interests of victims 
might be balanced against the rights of defendants or suspects, as Roberts and 
Hunter state, ‘[t]he enduring di8culty lies in translating this truism into 
practice’.21 Yet, as will be discussed, it is possible to improve the way testimo-
ny from children and complainants with an intellectual disability is taken and 
tested without compromising the defendant’s right to a fair trial or ability to 
test the prosecution’s case. Nevertheless, altering the traditional adversarial 
approach to cross-examination is required to achieve real change. ;is article 
will argue that removing the task of direct examination from defence and 
prosecution counsel and entrusting both examination-in-chief and cross-
examination to a suitably qualiMed third-party in advance of trial will produce 
higher quality evidence, improve the trial process for victims and preserve the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial by allowing the defence adequate opportunity 
to test the witness’s account. Ultimately, in this way, the triangulation of 
interests in balancing fairness to defendants, victims and society in the cross-
examination of young children and complainants with an intellectual disabil-
ity can be achieved. 
II   CONTEXT  
A  Background 
Due to their powerlessness, dependency or limited communication skills, 
children and people with intellectual disabilities are more likely than others to 
be the victims of sexual or physical abuse.22 Successive reports from academ-
ics23 and law reform agencies24 have highlighted the need for improved 
 
 
21 Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter, ‘;e Human Rights Revolution in Criminal Evidence and 
Procedure’ in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter (eds), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: 
Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Hart Publishing, 2012) 1, 21. 
 22 In relation to children, see David Finkelhor and Jennifer Dzuiba-Leatherman, ‘Victimisation 
of Children’ (1994) 49 American Psychiatry 173–83. In relation to persons with an intellectual 
disability, see Karen Hughes et al, ‘Prevalence and Risk of Violence Against Adults with 
Disabilities: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Observational Studies’ (2012) 379 
Lancet 1621; Amanda Mahoney and Alan Poling, ‘Sexual Abuse Prevention for People with 
Severe Developmental Disabilities’ (2011) 23 Journal of Developmental and Physical Disabili-
ties 369, 372; Moira Carmody, ‘Invisible Victims: Sexual Assault of People with an Intellectual 
Disability’ (1991) 17 Journal of Intellectual and Development Disability 229. 
 23 See, eg, David Caruso, ‘“I Don’t Want to Play Follow the Leader”: ;ree Proposals for Reform 
of the Cross-Examination of Child Witnesses’ [2011] Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law 
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measures to assist vulnerable persons in giving evidence, whether to investiga-
tors or in court. While some measures have been implemented, law reform 
agencies,25 governments26 and academics27 continue to assert that more can, 
and should, be done to improve the position of vulnerable witnesses. 
Until the early 1990s, children were considered ‘inherently unreliable’ as 
witnesses.28 Similar views of witnesses with intellectual disabilities were also 
held.29 However, it is now well-established that both persons with an intellec-
tual disability and children are capable of giving cogent and accurate testimo-
ny.30 Prohibitions on judicial warnings in relation to the reliability of children’s 
evidence in general now reRect this,31 although judges are still able to warn 
 
254; Cossins, ‘Evidentiary Safeguard or an Opportunity to Confuse’, above n 15. ;is aca-
demic attention has been longstanding: see, eg, Mark Brennan and Roslin E Brennan, Strange 
Language — Child Victims under Cross Examination (Riverina Murray Institute of Higher 
Education, 2nd ed, 1988); D Kelly Weisberg, ‘Sexual Abuse of Children: Recent Developments 
in the Law of Evidence’ (1984) 5(4) Children’s Legal Rights Journal 2. 
 24 See generally NSWLRC, Questioning of Complainants Report, above n 11; Victorian Law 
Reform Commission (‘VLRC’), Sexual O!ences Final Report, Report No 78 (2004); Robyn 
Layton, ‘Our Best Investment: A State Plan to Protect and Advance the Interests of Children’ 
(Child Protection Review, Government of South Australia, 2003); Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, ?e Receipt of Evidence by Queensland Courts: ?e Evidence of Children, Report 
No 55 (2000). 
 25 See, eg, Social Inclusion Board, ‘Strong Voices: A Blueprint to Enhance Life and Claim the 
Rights of People with Disability in South Australia (2012–2020)’ (Report, Government of 
South Australia, 2011) 54 (recommendation 19); ALRC and NSWLRC, Family Violence — A 
National Legal Response, ALRC Report No 114, NSWLRC Report No 128 (2010) vol 2, 1232 
[26.184], 1267 [27.144]. 
 26 See, eg, announcement by Deputy Premier and Attorney-General of South Australia: John 
Rau, ‘Improving the Justice System for Vulnerable Witnesses’ (News Release, 29 November 
2011). 
 27 See, eg, Caruso, ‘I Don’t Want to Play Follow the Leader: ;ree Proposals for Reform’, above n 
23; Cossins, ‘Evidentiary Safeguard or an Opportunity to Confuse?’ above n 15; Davies, 
Henderson and Hanna, above n 4. 
 28 Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) and NSWLRC, Family Violence Report, above 
n 26, vol 2, 1311 [28.11]; ALRC, Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process, 
Report No 84 (1997) [14.15]. See also Hargan v ?e King (1919) 27 CLR 13, 18 (Barton J). 
 29 See Benedet and Grant, above n 7, 9. 
 30 In relation to children, see Robyn Layton, ‘;e Child and the Trial’ in Justice Tom Gray, 
Martin Hinton and David Caruso (eds), Essays in Advocacy (Barr Smith Press, 2012) 201; 
AIJA, Bench Book, above n 4, 29–32. In relation to persons with an intellectual disability, see 
Kebbell, Hatton and Johnson, above n 7; Rebecca Milne and Ray Bull, ‘Interviewing Witness-
es with Learning Di8culties for Legal Purposes’ (2001) 29 British Journal of Learning Disabil-
ities 93, 96; Mark Kebbell and Chris Hatton, ‘People with Mental Retardation as Witnesses in 
Court’ (1999) 37 Mental Retardation 179. 
 31 See, eg, Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 12A; s 165A of the Uniform Evidence Acts (‘UEA’). ;e 
UEA are: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 2004 (Norfolk Island); Evidence Act 1995 
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about the potential unreliability of those with a mental health issue.32 Over 
the last twenty years, reforms and special measures to assist vulnerable 
witnesses have been implemented in all Australian,33 and many overseas,34 
jurisdictions. However, many of these reforms have had limited practical 
e=ect and major problems remain.  
Stephen Pallaras QC, the former South Australian Director of Public Pros-
ecutions, commented upon the major di8culties that typically arise in the 
prosecution of cases involving young children or complainants with an 
intellectual disability: 
A problem that cries out for inventive solutions is how better to facilitate the 
complaints of sexual abuse made by children and, in particular, children with 
disabilities. … [A] prosecutor looks to the witnesses to provide a coherent ac-
count of the allegations, for unless that can be done no court can properly con-
vict an accused. In the absence of a coherent account the prospects of obtaining 
a conviction could never be adjudged to be reasonable. However the very thing 
that a child complainant, disabled or not struggles to do is to give a coherent 
account.35 
Pallaras’s comments were in the a<ermath of a highly publicised South 
Australian case in 2011, when his o8ce withdrew charges against a school bus 
driver accused of the indecent assault of child passengers with an intellectual 
disability.36 It was reported that the reason for this decision was ‘because 
communication di8culties mean[t] the disabled victims [were] seen as 
unreliable witnesses who would not cope with cross-examination.’37 
Pallaras subsequently argued that the only solution to the problems in the 
cross-examination of complainants generally in sexual assault trials is a 
 
(NSW); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence 
Act 2008 (Vic). ;e Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applies in the ACT. 
 32 See UEA s 165(1)(c). 
 33 See Cossins, ‘Cross-Examining the Child Complainant’, above n 15, 95–6. For example, South 
Australian reforms include Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 13A. 
 34 See, eg, Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (South Africa) s 170A; Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 (UK) c 23, ss 27–9. 
 35 O8ce of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA), Annual Report 2010–11 (2011) 2. 
 36 Candice Keller, ‘Child Sex Case Dropped’, ?e Advertiser (Adelaide), 21 December 2011, 7; 
ABC News, ‘Charges Against Alleged Sex Abuser Likely to be Dropped’, PM, 7 December 
2011 (Nance Haxton) <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2011/s3385879.htm>. 
 37 ABC News, ‘Charges Against Alleged Sex Abuser Likely to be Dropped’, above n 36. See also 
ABC News, ‘Radio Current A=airs Documentary: Disabilities’, PM, 11 January 2012 (Nance 
Haxton) <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2012/s3405854.htm>. 
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fundamental shi< away from the common law adversarial system. He asserted 
that the adversarial model ‘is ill-equipped to deal with cases involving 
allegations of sexual assault particularly for children’.38 Pallaras claimed that 
‘[s]o long as we look at the adversarial trial model as the only method by 
which we can deal with these cases, [he does not] see a solution’.39 
;e signiMcance of Pallaras’s comments extends beyond South Australia. 
;ey serve to illustrate both the problems that are o<en confronted by 
children and witnesses with an intellectual disability in cross-examination and 
the inevitable di8culties that arise in devising an acceptable system that will 
alleviate these problems. ;is article considers some of these problems and 
whether more reliable methods for adducing and testing the evidence of 
children and complainants with an intellectual disability can be found without 
undermining a defendant’s vital right to a fair trial and ability to test the 
prosecution’s case.  
B  Current Australian Measures 
In common with most other Australian jurisdictions, South Australian courts 
have a wide discretion to use a range of measures to assist vulnerable witness-
es in giving evidence.40 However, it appears that, in practice, courts tend to 
use only those measures speciMcally listed in the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (such 
as permitting a companion to sit in court with the witness or using a CCTV 
link for live testimony).41 Some ‘out of court statements’ of vulnerable 
witnesses may also be admitted as evidence of the truth of their contents 
without the witness being called through s 34CA.42 However, this provision is 
currently under review owing to its problematic wording and operation, and 
has been the subject of varied interpretation and judicial calls for legislative 
reconsideration.43  
 
 38 ABC News, ‘Charges Against Alleged Sex Abuser Likely to be Dropped’, above n 36. 
 39 Ibid. 
 40 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 13, 13A. ;e two sections allow for the same measures, although 
s 13A applies speciMcally to ‘vulnerable witnesses’ as deMned in the Act. 
 41 Ibid ss 13(2)(a), (e), 13A(2)(a), (e). See, eg, R v T, AM [2014] SADC 31 (26 February 2014) 
[27]; R v H, R C [2012] SADC 182 (17 December 2012) [26]; R v C, S [2011] SADC 194 (21 
December 2011) [23]. 
 42 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34CA. ;is provision applies to those with a mental impairment 
and children under 12: sub-s (5). 
 43 David Caruso, ‘“I Don’t Want to Play Follow the Leader”: Reforms for the Cross-Examination 
of Child Witnesses and the Reception and Treatment of ;eir Evidence — Part 1’ (Paper 
presented at the AIJA Criminal Justice in Australia and New Zealand — Issues and Challeng-
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In all Australian jurisdictions, both legislation and the common law em-
power courts to control inappropriate cross-examination.44 In South Austral-
ia,45 and most uniform Evidence Act jurisdictions,46 the relevant legislation 
imposes a duty on the court to intervene to disallow improper questioning as 
statutorily deMned.47 In Victoria, the duty only applies in the context of 
vulnerable witnesses.48 Nevertheless, there remains an inescapable discretion-
ary element in these provisions,49 as a result of the necessity for judgment to 
be made on what is improper questioning in any given case. Further, research 
suggests that, despite their mandatory nature, these provisions will not be 
adequate to displace courts’ traditional reluctance to intervene in the cross-
examination of vulnerable witnesses.50 Justice Sleight provides insight into 
this reluctance. His Honour suggests: 
 
es for Judicial Administration Conference, Sydney, 9 September 2011) 23–4; H, SA v Police 
(2013) 116 SASR 547, 557 [53] (Kelly J), 588 [190] (Nicholson J); R v Byerley (2010) 107 
SASR 517, 524 [18] (Doyle CJ); R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563, 575 [59] (Duggan J), 593 [154] 
(Nyland J), 598 [180] (White J). 
 44 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15YE; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 21; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 22–5; 
Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 25–6; UEA ss 26, 29, 41, 42, 192A, 193. See also Libke v ?e Queen 
(2007) 230 CLR 559, 597–604 (Heydon J). 
 45 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 25(3). 
 46 ;e exceptions are s 41 of the Norfolk Island and Victoria Acts, where courts ‘may’ disallow a 
question. 
 47 See UEA s 41. 
 48 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 41(2). 
 49 Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex O=ences in Australia’, above n 15, 270 
[4.106]; Terese Henning, ‘Control of Cross-Examination — A SnowRake’s Chance in Hell?’ 
(2006) 30 Criminal Law Journal 133, 137. 
 50 In relation to children, see Russell Boyd and Anthony Hopkins, ‘Cross-Examination of Child 
Sexual Assault Complainants: Concerns About the Application of s 41 of the Evidence Act’ 
(2010) 34 Criminal Law Journal 149; Judy Cashmore and Lily Trimboli, ‘An Evaluation of the 
NSW Child Sexual Assault Specialist Jurisdiction Pilot’ (Research Report, New South Wales 
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2005) 51–6; Judge Roy Ellis, ‘Judicial Activism in 
Child Sexual Assault Cases’ (Paper presented at the National Judicial College of Australia 
Children and the Courts Conference, Sydney, 5 November 2005) [35]; Justice James Wood, 
‘Child Witnesses: ;e New South Wales Experience’ (Paper presented at Child Witnesses — 
Best Practice for Courts Conference, AIJA, District Court of NSW, Parramatta, 30 July 2004) 
4. In relation to persons with an intellectual disability, see Caitriona M E O’Kelly et al, ‘Judi-
cial Intervention in Court Cases Involving Witnesses With and Without Learning Di8cul-
ties’ (2003) 8 Legal and Criminological Psychology 229, 237–8. 
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If a Judge frequently interrupts cross-examination then the process can become 
disjointed, confrontational between the Judge and counsel and o<en add to the 
trauma of the complainant giving evidence.51  
Henderson additionally suggests that despite judges having the power to 
control and limit cross-examination, albeit restricted by the requirements of 
fairness, they may not recognise problems when they arise.52 Judges may also 
be reluctant to intervene in defence cross-examination for fear of jeopardising 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial and because they are conscious of the risks 
of an appeal if the accused is convicted.53 ;e discretionary elements of the 
current regime limit the ability of the implemented measures to systematically 
improve outcomes for child witnesses and those with an intellectual disability. 
Any proposed reforms must operate to negate this di8culty inherent in the 
adversarial system. 
III   COMPLICATIONS  ARISING  FROM CROSS -EXAMINATION  
;e cross-examination of children and intellectually disabled witnesses can 
result in inconsistent and inaccurate evidence,54 as well as cause further 
trauma to victims.55 ;is is due to the nature of cross-examination, the tactics 
o<en used by counsel, the language and phrasing of questions, and the delay 
between the initial complaint and trial. Despite the traditional preference for, 
and reliance on, witnesses to give evidence through live oral testimony in an 
adversarial system,56 this does not necessarily result in the ‘best’ evidence 
being received when the witness is a child or has an intellectual disability. 
 
 51 Judge Sleight, above n 3, 20. 
 52 Henderson, ‘Alternative Routes’, above n 15, 59. 
 53 ALRC, NSWLRC and VLRC, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report No 102, NSWLRC 
Report 112, VLRC Final Report (2005) 149 [5.97]. 
 54 In relation to children, see Cossins, ‘Evidentiary Safeguard or an Opportunity to Confuse?’ 
above n 15, 71, 90–1; Davies, Henderson and Hanna, above n 4; Zajac, Gross and Hayne, 
above n 5, 201. In relation to persons with an intellectual disability, see Benedet and Grant, 
above n 7, 14–15, 18–26; Kebbell, Hatton and Johnson, above n 7, 25–6. 
 55 In relation to children, see Eastwood and Patton, above n 14, 30; Cossins, ‘Evidentiary 
Safeguard or an Opportunity to Confuse?’ above n 15, 69. In relation to persons with an 
intellectual disability, see Abigail Gray, Suzie Forell and Sophie Clarke, ‘Cognitive Impair-
ment, Legal Need and Access to Justice’ (Paper No 10, Law and Justice Foundation of New 
South Wales, March 2009) 8. 
 56 Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180, 189 (Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ); Louise 
Ellison, ‘;e Protection of Vulnerable Witnesses in Court: An Anglo-Dutch Comparison’ 
(1999) 3 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 29, 34. 
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A  Discrediting the Witness 
Cross-examination continues to command great support in an adversarial 
legal process system. As Justice Rosenberg observes, ‘[c]ross-examination is 
the distinguishing feature of our adversary system’.57 It is undertaken to 
adduce evidence in favour of the defendant, undermine examination-in-chief 
and attack the witness’s credibility.58 Further, it has been described as a 
‘powerful and valuable weapon for the purpose of testing the veracity of a 
witness and the accuracy and completeness of his story’.59 
However, in recent years, the traditional faith in cross-examination as the 
best means for the discovery of the truth has been increasingly doubted. 
Eastwood and Patton argue that the true purpose of cross-examination has 
very little, if anything, to do with accuracy or truth. Rather, they contend the 
purpose of cross-examination ‘is more a process of manipulating the witness 
through suggestive questioning, avoiding unfavourable disclosures, and 
obtaining jury sympathy’.60 ;ey conclude that ‘[c]ross-examination tech-
niques are speciMcally designed to damage the e=ectiveness of the testimony 
and mute the voice of the complainant’.61 Birch similarly doubts the value of 
cross-examination and argues that a skilled cross-examiner merely serves ‘to 
make an honest witness appear at best confused and at worst a liar’.62  
;is criticism has proved especially applicable in respect of children63 and 
complainants with an intellectual disability.64 Assessments about the credibil-
 
 57 Marc Rosenberg, ‘;e Contribution of Chief Justice Lamer to the Development of the Law of 
Hearsay’ (2000) 5 Canadian Criminal Law Review 115, 119. 
 58 See Richard Du Cann, ?e Art of the Advocate (Penguin Books, 1980) 95; Glissan, above n 1, 
73–4; Colin Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (Oxford University Press, 11th ed, 2007) 
336. 
 59 Wakeley v ?e Queen (1990) 93 ALR 79, 86 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey and 
McHugh JJ), quoting Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd v Austin [1935] AC 346, 359 
(Viscount Sankey LC). See also Ex parte Elsee (1830) Mont 69, 70–2 n (a), citing Ex parte 
Lloyd (Unreported, Lord Eldon, 5 November 1822); John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law (Little, Brown, revised ed, 1974) vol 5, 32 [1367]. 
 60 Eastwood and Patton, above n 14, 4–5. 
 61 Ibid 5. 
 62 Diane J Birch, ‘;e Criminal Justice Act 1988 — Documentary Evidence’ (Pt 2) [1989] 
Criminal Law Review 15, 17. 
 63 See, eg, ALRC, Seen and Heard, above n 28, [14.110]–[14.111]; Cossins, ‘Alternative Models 
for Prosecuting Child Sex O=ences in Australia’, above n 15, 255 [4.42]; Louise Ellison, ‘;e 
Mosaic Art?: Cross-Examination and the Vulnerable Witness’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 353, 
353–4. 
 64 See, eg, Ellison, ‘;e Mosaic Art?’, above n 63, 353–4, 361–2; Benedet and Grant, above n 7, 
15–16. 
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ity of a witness’s statement are central in an adversarial trial. In trials for 
alleged o=ences of sexual or physical abuse, where the principal evidence is 
usually the complainant’s account of events weighed against that of the 
accused, assessments regarding credibility are o<en the deciding factor. In the 
case of a vulnerable complainant, an acquittal may well not be based on 
disbelieving the complainant’s account, but rather Mnding that the high 
standard of proof in a criminal case has not been satisMed.65 
;e testimony of children is o<en discredited for factors relating to their 
development, conMdence or intellect, as opposed to the reliability of their 
account.66 ;is allows cross-examiners to easily characterise a child witness as 
‘the aggressor’, ‘unchildlike’, ‘less than innocent’, confused or unreliable.67 ;e 
discrediting of complainants’ testimony because of unavoidable developmen-
tal or cognitive factors undermines the values and concepts that underpin the 
criminal justice system.  
Further, when cross-examining, a defence lawyer is in a position of control 
and power and can readily confuse, intimidate, manipulate and even bully 
children and witnesses with intellectual disabilities.68 Cross-examining a child 
has been likened to ‘shooting rats in a barrel … it’s easy to confuse them and 
make out they’re telling lies’.69 As stated by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission in their Seen and Heard Report, ‘[t]he contest between lawyer 
and child is an inherently unequal one’.70 In addition, Spencer has observed 
the consequences of intimidation in numerous trials; for example, he notes 
that 
sometimes [children] cannot be cross-examined because they are scared out of 
their wits and unable to communicate at all: like a little girl in a case I once 
 
 65 See, eg, Douglass v ?e Queen (2012) 290 ALR 699, 711–12 [48] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, 
Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
 66 In relation to children, see Helen L Westcott and Marcus Page, ‘Cross-Examination, Sexual 
Abuse and Child Witness Identity’ (2002) 11 Child Abuse Review 137, 140–3. Given the 
similarities in vulnerability found in witnesses with an intellectual disability, it is likely that 
similar problems will arise: see Ellison, ‘;e Mosaic Art?’, above n 63, 353–4. 
 67 Westcott and Page, above n 66, 143–6. 
 68 See generally Ellison, ‘;e Mosaic Art?’, above n 63, 360–2; Keane, ‘Cross-Examination of 
Vulnerable Witnesses’ above n 2, 176–9. 
 69 Brennan and Brennan, above n 23, 3. 
 70 ALRC, Seen and Heard, above n 28, [14.111]. 
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watched at Snaresbrook Crown Court, who got up from her chair as soon as 
cross-examination started and just ran away.71 
When children become anxious, the accuracy of their testimony typically 
diminishes due to di8culties in recalling memories.72 Even when questioned 
by professional and non-aggressive defence and prosecution lawyers, children 
o<en do not understand the questions posed to them.73 ;is is exacerbated by 
such witnesses being unlikely to seek clariMcation when they do not under-
stand questions.74 Further, children and persons with intellectual disabilities 
may acquiesce to statements they do not actually agree with.75 
Nevertheless, because it is a defence lawyer’s professional duty to advance 
their client’s case, discrediting a witness in this way may be perceived as a 
legitimate tactic to achieve this end.76 Indeed, in their 1998 study of the 
experiences of child complainants in sexual assault proceedings in Queens-
land, Eastwood, Patton and Stacy suggest the existence of a culture amongst 
defence counsel which considers that ‘if in the process of destroying the 
evidence it is necessary to destroy the child, then so be it’.77 Similarly damning 
Mndings are reported elsewhere.78  
 
 71 J R Spencer, ‘Introduction’ in John R Spencer and Michael E Lamb (eds), Children and Cross-
Examination: Time to Change the Rules? (Hart Publishing, 2012) 1. 
 72 L Henry et al, ‘Perceived Credibility and Eyewitness Testimony of Children with Intellectual 
Disabilities’ (2011) 55 Journal of Intellectual Disability Research 385, 386. 
 73 See Mark Brennan, ‘;e Discourse of Denial: Cross-Examining Child Victim Witnesses’ 
(1995) 23 Journal of Pragmatics 71, 73; Brennan and Brennan, above n 23. Cf Murphy and 
Clare, above n 9, 51 [3.28], who suggest that adjusting the style of questions during cross-
examination can minimise these problems in relation to persons with an intellectual disabil-
ity. 
 74 In relation to children, see Zajac, Gross and Hayne, above n 5, 199–200. In relation to 
persons with an intellectual disability, see Benedet and Grant, above n 7, 15. 
 75 In relation to children, see Zajac, Gross and Hayne, above n 5, 200; Rachel Zajac, Sarah 
O’Neill and Harlene Hayne ‘Disorder in the Courtroom? Child Witnesses under Cross-
Examination’ (2012) 32 Development Review 181, 186. In relation to persons with an intellec-
tual disability, see Murphy and Clare, above n 9, 50–1 [3.25]–[3.26]; Kebbell, Hatton and 
Johnson, above n 7, 29, 32; Benedet and Grant, above n 7, 15. 
 76 Glissan, above n 1, 74–5; Du Cann, above n 58, 95. 
 77 Christine Eastwood, Wendy Patton and Helen Stacy, ‘Child Sexual Abuse and the Criminal 
Justice System’ (Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice Series Paper No 99, Austral-
ian Institute of Criminology, December 1998) 3. 
 78 In relation to children, see, eg, Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex 
O=ences in Australia’, above n 15, 250–5 [4.14]–[4.41]; Layton, ‘Our Best Investment’ above n 
24, 15.13–15.14; Emma Davies, Emily Henderson and Fred W Seymour, ‘In the Interests of 
Justice? ;e Cross Examination of Child Complainants of Sexual Abuse in Criminal Pro-
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B  Duty of Counsel 
When considering the problems arising from the cross-examination of 
vulnerable witnesses, the professional duty of defence lawyers is o<en 
overlooked. Defence lawyers have a duty to ensure that their client’s case is 
presented ‘fully and properly’ and ‘fearlessly and with vigour and determina-
tion’.79 ;is duty is supported by professional guidelines.80 Further, in 
accordance with the rule in Browne v Dunn, the duty of the defence includes a 
requirement to put all relevant propositions and imputations, which will be 
relied on later, to the complainant.81 Accordingly, any discussion of proposed 
measures to adduce improved evidence from children and people with 
intellectual disabilities must also include consideration of defence lawyers’ 
professional duties to represent their client’s case vigorously and to put all 
relevant propositions to a witness. 
;e duties of a defence lawyer are qualiMed by rules of conduct which state 
that a lawyer must not ask a question that would ‘mislead’ or ‘confuse’ a 
witness, or one that would be ‘oppressive’, ‘harassing’ or ‘humiliating’ for the 
witness.82 ;ese are examples of the wider paramount duty of all lawyers to 
the administration of justice as an o8cer of the court.83 ;e application of 
these rules can be highly subjective and it may be di8cult for a defence lawyer 
to represent a client with ‘vigour and determination’84 without confusing a 
child witness or one who has an intellectual disability. ;is problem is 
compounded by the fact that cross-examination, including the demeanour 
 
ceedings’ (1997) 4 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 217; ALRC, Seen and Heard, above n 28, 
[14.111]. 
 79 Lewis v Judge Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682, 689 (Mason, Murphy, Wilson, Brennan and 
Dawson JJ). 
 80 See, eg, Australian Bar Association, Barristers’ Conduct Rules (27 November 2010) r 37; Bar 
Standards Board, Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (8th ed, 31 October 2004) 
r 303(a). 
 81 (1894) 6 R 67, 70–1 (Lord Halsbury). See also Du Cann, above n 58, 107; Glissan, above n 1, 
81. 
 82 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (June 2011) r 21.8. 
 83 See, eg, Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, 227 (Lord Reid); Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 
CLR 543, 556 (Mason CJ); Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, ‘;e Duty Owed to the Court — 
Sometimes Forgotten’ (Speech delivered at the Judicial Conference of Australia Colloquium, 
Melbourne, 9 October 2009). 
 84 Lewis v Judge Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682, 689 (Mason, Murphy, Wilson, Brennan and 
Dawson JJ). 
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and the language used by the examiner, remains the least regulated element of 
the adversarial criminal trial.85 
;e rule in Browne v Dunn requires all relevant propositions that will later 
be relied on to be put to a witness.86 However, it is established that children 
and persons with intellectual disabilities are likely to become confused and 
either change their version of events or acquiesce in a contradictory account 
when challenged. Challenging a vulnerable witness’s testimony in accordance 
with Browne v Dunn and suggesting an alternative version of facts may not 
advance the pursuit of truth.87  
C  Language and Phrasing of Questions 
Unnecessarily complex cross-examination questions may also impede 
vulnerable witnesses’ comprehension. Closed questions, which elicit a simple 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer from witnesses, have been shown to be the most frequently 
used but to elicit the least reliable evidence.88 One study found that children 
aged from Mve to eight years attempted to answer 75 per cent of nonsensical 
closed questions (eg, ‘Is a box louder than a knee?’) but only a small propor-
tion of nonsensical open questions (eg, ‘What do bricks eat?’).89 Closed 
questions can be rephrased as non-leading or open questions, which are less 
confusing and obtain more accurate responses.90 
Similarly, leading questions, which are questions that ‘directly or indirectly 
sugges[t] a particular answer to a question’,91 also obtain inaccurate respons-
 
 85 Cossins, ‘Evidentiary Safeguard or an Opportunity to Confuse?’, above n 15, 70. 
 86 (1894) 6 R 67, 70–1 (Lord Halsbury). 
 87 See, eg, R v Edwards [2011] EWCA Crim 3028 (16 November 2011). 
 88 In relation to children, see, eg, Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex 
O=ences in Australia’, above n 15, 260–1 [4.64]–[4.65]; Cossins, ‘Evidentiary Safeguard or an 
Opportunity to Confuse?’, above n 15, 78–82; Davies, Henderson and Hanna, above n 4, 353; 
Westcott and Page, above n 66, 142; Zajac, Gross and Hayne, above n 5, 200–1. In relation to 
persons with an intellectual disability, see Kebbell and Hatton, above n 30, 179–87; Kebbell, 
Hatton and Johnson, above n 7, 25; Mark R Kebbell et al, ‘People with Learning Di8culties as 
Witnesses in Court: What Questions Should Lawyers Ask?’ (2001) 29 British Journal of 
Learning Disabilities 98, 99–100; Benedet and Grant, above n 7, 13–15. See generally Keane, 
‘Cross-Examination of Vulnerable Witnesses, above n 2, 177–8. 
 89 Amanda H Waterman, Mark Blades and Christopher Spencer, ‘Do Children Try to Answer 
Nonsensical Questions?’ (2000) 18 British Journal of Developmental Psychology 211, 222. 
 90 Caruso, ‘I Don’t Want to Play Follow the Leader — Part 2’, above n 13, 8; Adrian Keane, 
‘Towards a Principled Approach to the Cross-Examination of Vulnerable Witnesses’ [2012] 
Criminal Law Review 407, 417. 
 91 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 3 (deMnition of ‘leading question’). 
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es.92 Confusing questions, such as questions containing double negatives,93 are 
also regularly used in the cross-examination of children and complainants 
with intellectual disabilities.94  
When questioned in a supportive and non-intimidating manner, children 
have been shown to make fewer mistakes due to reduced anxiety.95 Further, 
Kebbell, Hatton and Johnson state that the ‘accuracy and completeness’ of 
testimony from witnesses with an intellectual disability ‘can be signiMcantly 
improved if suitable questioning strategies are adopted.’96 ;e persistence of 
questioning techniques known to be unreliable supports the contention that 
traditional cross-examination is not a reliable mechanism for testing the 
evidence of either children or persons with an intellectual disability. ;e 
problem is exacerbated by judicial failure to intervene in inappropriate cross-
examination.97 
D  Delay 
In addition to the nature of cross-examination itself, the delay between the 
alleged o=ence and testifying at trial places the complainant in a disadvanta-
geous position as delay, stress and anxiety all diminish memory.98 In cases 
where the vulnerable witness is also the complainant, delay in testifying may 
also hinder their recovery.99 ;e delays that occur are commonly due to the 
process of gathering evidence, prosecutorial disclosure and setting trial 
dates.100 ;is has been shown to be a major problem for vulnerable witnesses 
 
 92 In relation to children, see Caruso, ‘I Don’t Want to Play Follow the Leader — Part 2’, above 
n 13, 2. In relation to persons with an intellectual disability, see Benedet and Grant, above 
n 7, 15; Kebbell et al, above n 88, 99. See also Nancy Perry et al, ‘When Lawyers Question 
Children: Is Justice Served?’ (1995) 19 Law and Human Behaviour 609. 
 93 For example the question, ‘Now, when you did that you did not say that it was something that 
you did not like?’: Kebbell et al, above n 88, 100. 
 94 In relation to children, see, eg, Judy Cashmore, ?e Evidence of Children (Judicial Commis-
sion of New South Wales, 1995) 33–6; Cashmore and Trimboli, above n 50, 46. In relation to 
persons with an intellectual disability, see also Kebbell, Hatton and Johnson, above n 7, 25. 
 95 See Westcott and Page, above n 66, 143. 
 96 Kebbell, Hatton and Johnson, above n 7, 24. 
 97 In relation to children, see Zajac, O’Neill and Hayne, above n 75, 196. In relation to witnesses 
with an intellectual disability, see O’Kelly et al, above n 50, 229–40. 
 98 Henderson, ‘Alternative Routes’ above n 15, 44. 
 99 See generally Home O8ce (UK), ‘Report of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence’ (Report 
No 8979, 1989) 15 [2.10]. 
 100 Jason Payne, ‘Criminal Trial Delays in Australia: Trial Listing Outcomes’ (Research and 
Public Policy Series Paper No 74, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2007) 30, 42–4, 46. 
2014] Cross-Examination of Vulnerable Witnesses 557 
in England, New Zealand, the United States and South Africa.101 ;ere is 
clearly beneMt, then, in taking and testing the complainant’s evidence as soon 
as practicable a<er prosecutorial disclosure. 
E  Conclusion 
In the adversarial system, testing a witness’s evidence by cross-examination is 
‘the primary evidentiary safeguard’.102 Conversely, it is clear that due to the 
adversarial method of testing evidence and the strategies commonly used, 
evidence elicited in cross-examination may not be accurate and complete 
when the complainant is a child or has an intellectual disability. ;ese 
problems are exacerbated by lengthy delays between the initial complaint and 
testifying at trial. ;ere is a need for change. But in considering any changes it 
is vital that the innocent are not wrongfully convicted and that the fairness of 
the trial is not compromised. 
IV  R IGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL  
A  Fairness Beyond the Accused 
Any measure that aims to both reduce the trauma experienced by complain-
ants and improve the accuracy of their evidence must not undermine the 
defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial.103 ;e right to a fair trial is a 
bundle of rights which, under human rights instruments, includes the right 
‘[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him’.104 As explained below, the right to cross-
examine witnesses is also a component of the right to a fair trial at common 
law. ;e right to a fair trial is both a fundamental common law right105 and an 
 
 101 Henderson, ‘Alternative Routes’, above n 15, 44–5. 
 102 Ellison, ‘;e Protection of Vulnerable Witnesses in Court’, above n 56, 35. 
 103 See generally Dietrich v ?e Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; J J Spigelman, ‘;e Truth Can Cost 
Too Much: ;e Principle of a Fair Trial’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 29. 
 104 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 14(3)(e) (‘ICCPR’). ;is is replicated in 
the ACT and Victoria which are the only two jurisdictions to have enacted human rights 
legisation: Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 22(2)(g); Charter of Human Rights and Responsi-
bilities Act 2006 (Vic) ss 25(2)(g)–(h). 
 105 See, eg, R v Macfarlane; Ex parte O’Flanagan (1923) 32 CLR 518, 541–2 (Isaacs J); McKin-
ney v ?e Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468, 478 (Mason CJ, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); 
Dietrich v ?e Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 334–5 (Deane J); Jago v District Court of New 
 
558 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 37:539 
internationally recognised human right.106 International conventions and 
international jurisprudence are particularly relevant in those Australian 
jurisdictions that have not enacted human rights instruments.107 ;ese 
instruments may inRuence judicial discretion, the development of the 
common law, and the interpretation of statutes via various well-established 
common law interpretive principles.108 So, for example in Dietrich v ?e 
Queen, members of the High Court had regard to international human rights 
treaties and jurisprudence in considering the attributes of a fair trial.109 In the 
criminal justice context, the right to a fair trial has been conceived as a 
defendant-centric right; as primarily, if not exclusively, focussed on ensuring 
fairness to the defendant.110 Nevertheless, Australian courts have acknowl-
edged that the right to a fair trial extends beyond the rights of the accused to 
include the interests of the community and the protection of witnesses.111 ;is 
approach is consistent with the conceptualisation of the right to a fair trial in 
European and United Kingdom human rights jurisprudence as a ‘triangula-
tion of interests’. A clear articulation of this approach is that of Lord Steyn in 
Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999): 
;ere must be fairness to all sides. In a criminal case this requires the court to 
consider a triangulation of interests. It involves taking into account the position 
of the accused, the victim and his or her family, and the public.112 
 
South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23, 29 (Mason CJ), 56 (Deane J), 72 (Toohey J), 75 (Gaudron J); 
Spigelman, above n 103, 36–7. 
 106 ICCPR art 14. 
 107 Jeremy Gans et al, Criminal Process and Human Rights (Federation Press, 2011) 9. See also 
Terese Henning and Jill Hunter, ‘Finessing the Fair Trial for Complainants and the Accused: 
Mansions of Justice or Castles in the Air?’ in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter (eds), Criminal 
Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Hart Publish-
ing, 2012) 347, 349–50. 
 108 Wendy Lacey, ‘Judicial Discretion and Human Rights: Expanding the Role of International 
Law in the Domestic Sphere’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 108, 109. 
 109 (1992) 177 CLR 292, 300, 304–7 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 334 (Deane J), 351 (Toohey J), 
373 (Gaudron J). 
 110 See, eg, R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55, 69 [108] (Stein JA, Sully and Levine JJ). 
 111 Barton v ?e Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 101 (Gibbs ACJ and Mason J), quoted in Dietrich v 
?e Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 335 (Deane J); Jago v District Court of New South Wales 
(1989) 168 CLR 23, 33 (Mason CJ), 49–50, 54 (Brennan J); R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 250, 
263–4 [54]–[57] (Whealy J); Ragg v Magistrates Court of Victoria (2008) 18 VR 300, 319 [77] 
(Bell J); R v Wilkie (2005) 193 FLR 291, 305 [54] (Howie J). 
 112 [2001] 2 AC 91, 118. For a similar statement in an Australian context, see Justice J Badgery-
Parker, ‘;e Criminal Process in Transition: Balancing Principle and Pragmatism’ (Pt 1) 
(1995) 4 Journal of Judicial Administration 171, 172. 
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While this principle has found expression in a number of Australian cases,113 
it is yet to be regularly or consistently applied and its implications are yet to be 
widely realised.  
;e triangulation conception of fair trial rights has been endorsed by the 
House of Lords and the Privy Council, which have accepted that whilst it is 
‘axiomatic’114 under the European Convention on Human Rights115 that a 
defendant enjoys a ‘fundamental and absolute right’116 to a fair trial, the 
notion and content of a fair trial extends beyond the interests of the accused 
to encompass the ‘triangulation’ of interests identiMed by Lord Steyn.117 
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has observed:  
In appropriate cases, principles of fair trial require that the interests of the de-
fence are balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify, 
in particular where life, liberty or security of persons are at stake …118 
‘Despite the [apparent] inherent tensions between these interests’, as the Irish 
Law Commission observes, ‘the underlying goal is the same — that the guilty 
are convicted and the innocent acquitted’.119 
Both Australian and overseas courts view fairness in criminal trials as ‘a 
constantly evolving concept’ which changes not only from century to century 
but from decade to decade and according to whichever social and legal values 
prevail.120 ;is evolutionary capacity, together with the conception of fair 
trials as involving a triangulation of interests, enables reassessment of how the 
defendant’s fair trial right to cross-examine witnesses might be implemented 
to overcome unfairness to witnesses o<en inherent in traditional modes of 
 
 113 See, eg, Ragg v Magistrates Court of Victoria (2008) 18 VR 300, 319 [77] (Bell J); R v Lodhi 
(2006) 199 FLR 250, 263–4 [56] (Whealy J). 
 114 R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, 68 (Lord Oliver). 
 115 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as 
amended by Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, opened for signature 13 
May 2004, CETS No 194 (entered into force 1 June 2010) art 6. 
 116 Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817, 851 (Lord Hope). See also R v Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473, 487. 
 117 R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45, 65 [38] (Lord Steyn). See also R v H [2004] 2 AC 134, 146 [12] 
(Lord Bingham for Lords Bingham, Woolf CJ, Hope, Walker and Carswell). 
 118 PS v Germany (2003) 36 EHRR 61, [22]. 
 119 Ireland Law Reform Commission, Report: Prosecution Appeals and Pre-Trial Hearings, Report 
No LRC 81-2006 (2006) 5 [1.03]. See also Gans et al, above n 107, 511. 
 120 R v H [2004] 2 AC 134, 145–6 [11] (Lord Bingham for Lords Bingham, Woolf CJ, Hope, 
Walker and Carswell). See also Dietrich v ?e Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 328 (Deane J); 
State v Donoghue [1976] IR 325, 350 (O’Higgins CJ); Roberts and Hunter, above n 21, 20. 
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cross-examination. Encouragement in this endeavour can be obtained from 
the words of Lord Chief Justice Judge on the need for reform in relation to 
vulnerable witnesses: ‘One of the great advantages of the common law 
system … is that it is a Rexible system, capable of steady adaptation to the 
needs of contemporary society’.121 
B  ?e Role of Cross-Examination in a Fair Trial 
At common law it is accepted that the right to cross-examination is an 
essential part of the adversarial criminal trial, rather than a right that needs 
express authority.122 In Browne v Dunn, Lord Halsbury said, ‘[t]o my mind 
nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses 
upon evidence which they have given’.123 Similarly, Wigmore remarked that 
cross-examination ‘is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invent-
ed for the discovery of truth’.124 Indeed, as Wigmore indicates, cross-
examination is regarded as one of the most important evidentiary safeguards 
of the adversarial system125 and as an entrenched right of a defendant. 
However, it is o<en forgotten that even Wigmore, immediately a<er his 
famous words, recognised the need for cross-examination to be controlled 
given its potential to distort the truth.126 Wigmore observed, ‘[a] lawyer can 
do anything with a cross-examination … He may, it is true, do more than he 
ought to do … [he] may make the truth appear like falsehood’.127 
;is is particularly true for children and witnesses with intellectual disabil-
ities. As discussed in detail in Part III above, for vulnerable witnesses, 
traditional cross-examination may not expose unreliability so much as 
produce it. A defendant’s ‘right’ to cross-examination should not justify using 
 
 121 Lord Judge, ‘Vulnerable Witnesses in the Administration of Criminal Justice’ (Speech 
delivered at the 17th Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Oration in Judicial Ad-
ministration, Sydney, 7 September 2011). 
 122 Judge Sleight, above n 3, 16–17. Cf Eastwood and Patton, above n 14, 127, who argue that the 
right to cross-examination is not a ‘fundamental right’ but instead ‘an incident of the obliga-
tion of the court to ensure a fair trial’. 
 123 [1894] 6 R 67, 76. See further such Australian cases as Dayman v Simpson [1935] SASR 320, 
321 (Napier J); Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840, 846–7 (Newton J). 
 124 Wigmore, above n 59, 32 [1367]. 
 125 Ibid. 
 126 Ibid. 
 127 Ibid. See also Frank E Vandervort, ‘A Search for the Truth or Trial by Ordeal: When 
Prosecutors Cross-Examine Adolescents How Should Courts Respond?’ (2010) 16 Widener 
Law Review 335, 335. 
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methods and techniques known to confuse or mislead vulnerable witnesses, 
especially where this may lead to inaccurate evidence being adduced at trial.  
;is proposition Mnds support in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 128 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.129 ;e 
former provides that the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration 
of courts during legal proceedings.130 ;e latter stipulates that a person with a 
disability who is a witness in legal proceedings must be appropriately accom-
modated in order to facilitate e=ective and equal participation.131 Further, the 
United Nations’ Guidelines on Justice Matters Involving Child Victims and 
Witnesses of Crime aims to ensure that measures are developed and imple-
mented to make it easier for children to testify.132 
Additionally, despite the rhetoric concerning the importance of cross-
examination and its status as a bastion of the defendant’s right to a fair trial, 
evidence that has not been cross-examined is still admissible in court. ;is is 
particularly possible through one of the many common law and statutory 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.133 In recent times, recognition that the defend-
ant’s ‘right’ to cross-examination can and should be qualiMed in certain 
circumstances134 has led to the modiMcation overseas of defendants’ right to 
cross-examine vulnerable witnesses. ;ese developments have been accom-
panied by changes in courts’ views of the central importance of cross-
examination to defendants’ right to a fair trial.135 ;e approach of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights has been to consider whether the proceedings in 
 
 128 Opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 
1990). 
 129 Opened for signature 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
 130 Convention on the Rights of the Child art 3(1). See also arts 12, 39. 
 131 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art 13(1). 
 132 Guidelines on Justice Matters Involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime, ESC 
Res 2005/20 (22 July 2005) [30]–[31], [40]–[42]. 
 133 See, eg, the exception to the hearsay rule for Mrst-hand hearsay in criminal trials enacted in 
s 65 of the UEA, which enables the admission of prior representations made by people who 
are not available to testify and therefore unable to be cross-examined. 
 134 See, eg, Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex O=ences in Australia’, above n 
15, 273 [4.122]; Christine Eastwood, ‘;e Experiences of Child Complainants of Sexual 
Abuse in the Criminal Justice System’ (Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 
Series Paper No 250, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2003) 4; Eastwood and Patton, 
above n 14, 30–1. 
 135 See, eg, R v Barker [2010] EWCA Crim 4 (21 January 2010) [42] (Lord Judge CJ for Lord 
Judge CJ, Hallett LJ and Macur J); R v Edwards [2011] EWCA Crim 3028 (16 November 
2011); R v Watts [2010] EWCA Crim 1824 (23 July 2010) [17] (Mackay J for Lord CJ, Ra=er-
ty J and Mackay J). 
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their entirety are fair, rather than how particular evidence is tested.136 ;is 
approach accords with the trend noted earlier in both Australian and overseas 
determinations of fair trial issues to balance the interests of defendants, 
witnesses and the community. 
Another change that has occurred in England, that has implications for the 
centrality of cross-examination to fair trials, is the relaxation of the rule in 
Browne v Dunn insofar as it applies to vulnerable complainants. In R v 
Edwards, for example, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to 
direct defence counsel not to put the defence case to the young complainant, 
in particular not to challenge her recollection of events.137 ;e trial judge’s 
direction was as follows: 
Whilst cross-examination of witnesses is commonly and properly robust, in the 
case of a very young child it isn’t. I shall say to you that you must ask such ques-
tions to which you want actual answers, but I will say to the jury that the nature 
of the defence in this case has been set out in writing, [in a defence case state-
ment] and you are neither required, nor should you, put that to the witness.138 
In order to maintain the fairness of the trial, the jury was informed of the 
judge’s direction and the need to make allowances for it.139 ;e Court of 
Appeal found that the conduct of the trial had been ‘astute, balanced, meas-
ured and fair and nothing in it gives us any cause to doubt the safety of the 
conviction’.140 R v Edwards illustrates that qualiMcation of the defendant’s right 
to cross-examine can be appropriate and that a criminal trial can still be fair 
when traditional adversarial procedures are modiMed.  
Again we see in these cases recognition that the concept and content of a 
fair trial involves multiple interests. Importantly, we also see acceptance that 
cross-examination as traditionally practised can be modiMed in the interests 
of vulnerable witnesses without undermining defendants’ fair trial rights.  
 
 136 See, eg, Al-Khawaja v United Kingdom (2012) 54 EHRR 23, [142]–[143]. See generally Keane, 
‘Towards a Principled Approach’, above n 90, 417–9. 
 137 [2011] EWCA Crim 3028 (16 November 2011) [28] (Ra=erty LJ for Ra=erty LJ, MacDu= J 
and Judge Jacobs). 
 138 Ibid [7]. 
 139 Ibid [6]–[7]. 
 140 Ibid [30]. 
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V  MEASURES  IMPLEMENTED  TO FACILITATE THE RECEPTION   
OF VULNERABLE W ITNESSES ’  TESTIMONY  
A broad range of measures have been enacted in Australia and overseas to 
facilitate the reception of vulnerable witnesses’ testimony and to improve 
cross-examination.141 ;ey include limitations on the defendant’s right to 
cross-examine complainants in person in particular cases; the development of 
best practice guidelines; training for the legal profession; screening witnesses 
from the defendant; allowing vulnerable witnesses to give evidence out of 
court via CCTV; permitting them to have a support person with them when 
testifying; admitting at trial a pre-trial audio-visual recording of part or all of 
their testimony; and establishment of intermediary programs. While these 
measures have improved the situation for vulnerable witnesses in very many 
respects, underlying problems remain, as will be discussed below. 
;is has therefore prompted the question of whether a solution might not 
lie in more fundamental change. SpeciMcally, it has stimulated interest in 
systems similar to those used in inquisitorial systems like Norway, where 
independent experts conduct the entire examination of vulnerable witnesses. 
Consideration of reforms enacted to date, and of the research conducted and 
the recommendations made, has led to the conclusion in this article that if the 
best possible evidence is to be elicited from children and witnesses with 
intellectual disabilities, properly trained independent interviewers should 
conduct video-recorded investigative interviews and evidential examinations 
of these witnesses before a judicial o8cer. ;ose video recordings should then 
be admitted at trial and constitute the entire testimony of these witnesses. 
;ere is existing precedent in Australia for trained interviewers to conduct 
recorded interviews of vulnerable witnesses. In New South Wales, for exam-
ple, Joint Investigative Response Teams — teams of people from NSW Family 
& Community Services, NSW Police and NSW Health — perform this task. 
;e recorded interviews are admitted at trial as the witnesses’ examination-in-
chief.142 However, this process does not obviate the need for the witness to 
 
 141 ;ere are a range of other measures which may improve other aspects of the criminal justice 
process for vulnerable complainants. For example, victim case management workers may 
reduce trauma and better identify the nuances of particular disabilities. Likewise, more guilty 
pleas and less stress could be achieved through creating alternative punishments or a system 
based on principles of restorative justice. Further, methods used in investigative interviews 
and examination-in-chief could be improved to enhance the accuracy and cogency of the 
testimony elicited from a child or intellectually disabled person, which in turn could result in 
more successful prosecutions. However, such suggestions are beyond the scope of this article, 
as they do not directly impact on cross-examination. 
 142 See Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 306R, 306U. 
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undergo cross-examination in the usual way subsequently at trial. It therefore 
does not deal with the problem of inappropriate cross-examination. ;e 
following sections will consider some of the mechanisms currently deployed 
in Australia. Discussion of the use of CCTV and screens is omitted because 
these measures are not directed at modifying the nature or quality of cross-
examination. 
A  Best Practice Guidelines 
Best practice guidelines have been developed in some Australian jurisdictions, 
to provide appropriate guidance during the questioning of vulnerable 
witnesses.143 Such guidelines have the potential to help ensure questions are 
asked in an appropriate style and format that avoids the problematic question-
ing conventions outlined above. Additionally, they provide advice and a 
standard to assist judges to better monitor cross-examination. For example, 
the Western Australian Guidelines for Cross-Examination of Children and 
Persons Su!ering a Mental Disability stipulate that questions should be ‘simple’ 
and witnesses should not be accused of ‘lying’.144  
However, these measures are only likely to have a limited e=ect.145 While 
such guidelines may provide some assistance in how to rephrase questions,146 
the examples given are not particularly comprehensive. Lord Judge CJ 
observed in R v Barker that, ‘it should not be over-problematic for the 
advocate to formulate short, simple questions which put the essential ele-
ments of the defendant’s case to the witness’.147 Yet advocates who are steeped 
in the conventions and culture of traditional cross-examination may, in fact, 
Mnd it quite hard to adjust their questioning techniques. Judges also may Mnd 
 
 143 See, eg, District Court of Western Australia, Circular to Practitioners CRIM 2010/1: 
Guidelines for Cross-Examination of Children and Persons Su!ering a Mental Disability (8 
September 2010) <http://www.districtcourt.wa.gov.au/_Mles/Circular%20to%20Practitioners 
%202010-1.doc>; Department of the Attorney-General (WA), Equality Before the Law: Bench 
Book (November 2009) 4.4.6–4.4.10 [4.4.3.3.2]–[4.4.3.3.5], 5.5.6–5.5.11 [5.5.5]–[5.5.6] 
<http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_Mles/equality_before_the_law_benchbook.pdf>; 
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality Before the Law: Bench Book (June 2006) 
5407–11 [5.4.3.5]–[5.4.3.7], 6307–11 [6.3.4]–[6.3.5] <http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/ 
publications/benchbks/equality/benchbook.pdf>; AIJA, Bench Book, above n 4, 92–3 [4.7.3], 
95–6 [4.9]. 
 144 District Court of Western Australia, above n 143, 1 [2.2], 2 [2.8]. 
 145 Spencer, ‘Conclusions’, above n 13, 189. 
 146 See, eg, Judicial Commission of New South Wales, above n 143, 5407–11 [5.4.3.5]–[5.4.3.7]. 
 147 [2010] EWCA Crim 4 (21 January 2010) [42] (Lord Judge CJ for Lord Judge CJ, Hallett LJ 
and Macur J). 
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it di8cult to remember to ensure adherence to appropriate questioning styles, 
particularly if they have limited experience of child witnesses or witnesses 
with intellectual disabilities. 
While guidelines do serve an educational function and set a benchmark 
for proper practice, entrenched adversarial culture dilutes their value in 
practice.148 ;is is emphasised by the fact that reports of intimidation and 
confusion remain constant throughout Australia,149 despite many jurisdic-
tions having rules that impose a duty on courts to disallow annoying, harass-
ing or otherwise inappropriate questions.150 As noted earlier, the evidence to 
date is that legislatively imposed mandates have made and will probably make 
few inroads on abusive or inappropriate cross-examination, due to the 
reluctance of judges to exercise their discretion to intervene.151 Accordingly, 
the potential for non-statutory guidelines to do so would appear slim. 
Henderson observes that common law restrictions and statutory prohibitions 
regarding vulnerable witnesses are ‘frequently deliberately ignore[d]’ by 
advocates.152 Eastwood and Patton similarly refer to ‘a core of defence lawyers 
[who] simply refuse to be controlled’.153 Such research suggests that, at the 
very least, without appropriate education and training it is impractical to 
require lawyers and judges to be aware of the appropriate way to question 
children and witnesses with intellectual disabilities and that, therefore, 
professional guidelines should be supported by appropriate training. Yet, this 
research also suggests, as is argued below, that education and training may 
ultimately prove ine=ective to dislodge what is a systemically located problem. 
 
 148 Spencer, ‘Conclusions’, above n 13, 189. 
 149 See, eg, Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex O=ences in Australia’, above n 
15, 255 [4.42]; ALRC, Seen and Heard, above n 28, [14.111]. 
 150 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 41; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 41; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 41; 
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 41; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 26. See also Australian Solicitors’ 
Conduct Rules, above n 82, r 21.2.3. 
 151 For examples relating to children, see Cossins, ‘Alternative Models for Prosecuting Child Sex 
O=ences in Australia’, above n 15, 268 [4.98]–[4.100]; NSWLRC, Questioning of Complain-
ants Report, above n 11, [3.51]–[3.57]. For examples relating to witnesses with intellectual 
disabilities, see O’Kelly et al, above n 50, 237; ALRC, Uniform Evidence Law, above n 53, 146 
[5.83]. See further, in relation to vulnerable witnesses generally, Boyd and Hopkins, above n 
50. 
 152 Henderson, ‘Alternative Routes’, above n 15, 57. 
 153 Eastwood and Patton, above n 14, 126.  
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B  Training and Education for Advocates and the Judiciary 
It has been established that the judiciary are just as likely to intervene during 
the questioning of a member of the general population as they are during the 
questioning of an adult with an intellectual disability.154 ;is, in combination 
with the research discussed above concerning the use of guidelines, suggests 
the need for improved and regularly reinforced education and training for 
advocates and the judiciary.155  
Of course, knowledge gained from intermittent or even undergraduate 
training may not be readily retained. It was suggested in England that some 
lawyers could be trained to be specialised ‘young witness practitioners.156 ;is 
would clearly overcome the problem of knowledge attrition. However, the 
idea of accredited child examiners gained little support from the legal 
profession. Rather, general education on cross-examination was favoured.157  
Accordingly, it has been argued that education and training can have lim-
ited impact because the problem of inappropriate cross-examination is 
systemic. It resides in the very fabric of the adversarial process, which 
promotes and entrenches particular questioning conventions, prevents their 
identiMcation by the legal profession as unfair and, consequently, impedes 
their abandonment.158 It has been suggested that, ‘[t]he culture of the Bar and 
philosophy of accusatorial advocacy are fundamentally opposed to making 
many of the necessary changes’.159 For example, because it is defence lawyers’ 
aim during cross-examination to advance their clients’ interests,160 they may 
necessarily feel compelled to exploit witnesses’ vulnerabilities in cross-
examination.161 In this environment, education and training, while necessary, 
may nevertheless be insu8cient to achieve fundamental change. 
 
 154 O’Kelly et al, above n 50, 229, 237.  
 155 Powell, above n 55, 141; Lord Judge, above n 121, 12, Boyd and Hopkins, above n 50,  
164–5. 
 156 Joyce Plotniko= and Richard Woolfson, ‘“Kicking and Screaming” — ;e Slow Road to Best 
Evidence’ in John R Spencer and Michael E Lamb (eds), Children and Cross-Examination: 
Time to Change the Rules? (Hart Publishing, 2012) 37. 
 157 Ibid. 
 158 See, eg, Boyd and Hopkins, above n 50, 162–4.  
 159 Henderson, ‘Alternative Routes’, above n 15, 57.  
 160 Glissan, above n 1, 74; Du Cann, above n 58, 95. 
 161 ALRC, Seen and Heard, above n 28, [14.111].  
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C  Prerecorded Evidence 
In all Australian jurisdictions except the Commonwealth, there is provision 
for particular witnesses’ evidence to be given and recorded in pre-trial 
proceedings in the absence of the jury and then replayed at trial.162 In the 
ACT, Northern Territory, Tasmania, and Victoria, this facility is only available 
in trials for prescribed o=ences.163 Additionally, Victoria makes a distinction 
between vulnerable witnesses generally, and those who are complainants:164 
for vulnerable complainants in sexual assault trials, all pre-recorded evidence 
is admissible; for vulnerable witnesses generally, only pre-recorded evidence-
in-chief is admissible but is available in serious o=ence, as well as sexual 
assault, trials. Similarly, in New South Wales, the evidence taken is conMned to 
use as all or part of the witnesses’ evidence-in-chief.165 
;e Western Australian prerecording model (in operation since 1992 in 
relation to children)166 is now Mrmly embedded in the State’s criminal justice 
process. Defence and prosecution counsel, as well as the judiciary, agree that it 
has improved the process in a number of important ways.167 ;e beneMts 
identiMed from prerecording the entirety of vulnerable witnesses’ testimony 
include: maximising the quality of the witness’s account by capturing it at the 
earliest opportunity;168 relieving witnesses from the stress of testifying in a 
traditional court environment;169 potentially encouraging early pleas;170 and 
amendment of indictments because of enhanced assessment by the parties of 
 
 162 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) div 4.2B; Evidence Act (NT) s 21B; 
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 21A, 21AI–21AO; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 13A(2)(b); Evidence 
(Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 (Tas), ss 6, 6A; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) 
pt 8.2 div 5, pt 8.2 div 6; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 106I, 106RA.  
 163 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) div 4.2B (sexual o=ences); Evidence Act 
(NT) s 21B(1) (sexual or serious violence o=ences); Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses 
Act 2001 (Tas) s 6 (‘prescribed proceedings’); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 369 (sexual 
o=ences).  
 164 Compare Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) pt 8.2 div 6 with pt 8.2 div 5. 
 165 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 306U. 
 166 See Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and Others) Act 1992 (WA) item 8. 
 167 Hanna et al, above n 15, 150–1; Judge Sleight, above n 3, 9–14. But for problems with the use 
of prerecorded evidence, see Kelly Richards, ‘Child Complainants and the Court Process in 
Australia’ (Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, Paper No 380, Australian Insti-
tute of Criminology, July 2009) 5.  
 168 Davies, Henderson and Hanna, above n 4, 350. 
 169 ALRC, Seen and Heard, above n 28, [14.46]. 
 170 See Hanna et al, above n 15, 151. 
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the evidence.171 Additionally, prerecording witnesses’ testimony o=ers the 
potential to encourage greater judicial intervention in cross-examination. ;is 
is because the recordings can be edited in order to remove any o=ending 
questioning as well as the judicial intervention itself, thus eliminating possible 
juror perceptions of judicial bias as a result of the intervention.172 
In contrast to Western Australia, the extent to which the opportunity to 
prerecord vulnerable witnesses’ testimony is utilised in other Australian 
jurisdictions varies and may depend on the degree to which the process is 
supported by prosecutorial agencies. Accordingly, several criminal justice 
agencies have reported that prerecording of testimony is frequently used and 
regarded as working well — particularly in sexual o=ences trials in remote 
communities, where it is seen as having increased the reporting rates of 
o=ences against Indigenous women.173 In contrast, in New South Wales, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’), as recently as 2010, has expressed 
opposition to the routine use of prerecorded evidence, arguing that it would 
add another step in the trial process and possibly cause further delay.174 ;is 
view ignores the long history of satisfaction with the operation of the scheme 
in Western Australia and the varied nature of its beneMts, including for 
complainants. It evidences an administrative-centred focus rather than a 
witness-centred approach to the process. It must also be remembered that 
because there is no provision in New South Wales for the entirety of witnesses’ 
testimony to be prerecorded, the New South Wales DPP’s opposition is not 
based on experience of a full prerecording model.  
In South Australia, prerecorded evidence is admissible under the general 
discretion conferred on the court by s 13A(2)(b) of the Evidence Act 1929 
(SA).175 Additionally, video records of initial interviews with police or 
specialists are not expressly admissible under the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), but 
s 34CA has been used to that e=ect.176 Recent amendments177 to the Evidence 
 
 171 Davies, Henderson and Hanna, above n 4, 351; Judge Sleight, above n 3, 13. 
 172 ;is has been identiMed as a reason for judicial reluctance to intervene in cross-examination. 
For a more detailed analysis, see Terese Henning, ‘Obtaining the Best Evidence from Chil-
dren and Witnesses with Cognitive Impairments — “Plus Ça Change” or Prospects New?’ 
(2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 155, 159. 
 173 See ALRC, Family Violence Report, above n 26, 1229–30 [26.172]–[26.174]. 
 174 Ibid 1230 [26.176]. 
 175 See also Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 104. 
 176 ;ere is confusion surrounding the use of this provision for this purpose. A literal reading of 
s 34CA allows for prerecorded evidence to be admitted, and indeed it has been in a number 
of cases, o<en without defence objection: see, eg, H, SA v Police (2013) 116 SASR 547, 551 
[14]–[16], 557 [53] (Kelly J); R v J, AP [2013] SASCFC 121 (14 November 2013) [10], [12] 
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Act 1929 (SA) allow out of court statements to be admitted as truth of their 
contents without the witness being available for cross-examination if the 
witness does not testify due to fear and it is in the interests of justice to do 
so.178 Fear is given a broad deMnition.179 While the section is yet to be used, a 
very similar provision in England has been held not to contravene a defend-
ant’s right to a fair trial, even if it constitutes the sole or dominant evidence at 
trial.180 If it is fair to remove direct cross-examination when the witness is 
fearful, it should also be fair to remove direct cross-examination when the 
complainant is a young child or intellectually disabled person. ;is is further 
supported by models in operation in such countries as Norway, discussed 
below, where there is no direct questioning of vulnerable witnesses by either 
prosecution or defence counsel. 
;e New South Wales regime that permits pre-trial prerecorded state-
ments to be used only for the purpose of evidence-in-chief clearly can have no 
impact upon how cross-examination is conducted. Further, they cannot 
ameliorate problems associated with delay in testifying. Nevertheless, it is 
acknowledged that these provisions may improve the overall position of 
children and witnesses with intellectual disabilities by maximising the 
cogency and quality of their examination-in-chief. New South Wales, Victoria, 
Western Australia, Tasmania and the Commonwealth all allow audio-visual 
records of police (or other investigating o8cials) interviews with a child or 
intellectually disabled person to be used as admissible evidence, either in 
addition to, or in place of, examination-in-chief.181 Such videos are now 
 
(Kelly J); R v Douglass (2012) 290 ALR 699, 704–5 [17]–[18] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, 
Kiefel and Bell JJ); R v Byerley (Question of Law Reserved No 1 of 2010) (2010) 107 SASR 517; 
R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563, 574–5 [47]–[55] (Duggan J). However, this was not the appar-
ent intention of the provision. ;e South Australian Attorney-General in late 2011 foreshad-
owed new legislation to provide for the mandated taking and use of prerecorded interviews 
with children and witnesses with an intellectual disability in criminal cases involving sexual 
or violent o=ence: see Rau, above n 30. However, at April 2014, no Bill has been introduced 
to State Parliament.  
 177 Statutes Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2012 (SA) s 41. 
 178 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34KA(2)(e), (4). 
 179 Ibid s 34KA(3), which speciMes that ‘fear is to be widely construed and includes, for example, 
fear of the death or injury of another person or of Mnancial loss’. 
 180 See R v Sellick [2005] 1 WLR 3257.  
 181 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15YM; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 306R, 306U; Criminal 
Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 367 with Criminal Procedure Regulations 2009 (Vic) reg 5; Evi-
dence Act 1906 (WA) s 106H(2c). It should be noted that Evidence (Children and Special 
Witnesses) Act 2001 (Tas) s 5(1) only applies to children. 
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regularly, if not invariably, used as evidence in these jurisdictions.182 One 
beneMt of admitting the record of an investigative interview is that the 
interview is taken at a time when the events are fresher in a witness’s mind, 
even more so than at a pre-trial recording. Further, the evidence is o<en 
received in a more free-Rowing narrative and logical sequence,183 which is 
known to enhance the quality and accuracy of a child’s testimony.184 
However, a disadvantage of admitting a police interview as evidence is that 
editing will o<en be required as not everything said in an interview will be 
admissible.185 ;e objectives of an investigative interview and evidential 
examination are distinct. It may be impractical to restrict investigators in the 
questions they ask so as to conform to the rules of admissibility. 
;ere are other di8culties with prerecorded evidence more generally. In 
other countries where prerecording is permitted by legislation,186 it has been 
suggested that it is not widely used due to the resistance or ignorance of 
practitioners.187 ;ere are also potential logistical factors such as court costs 
and resources, and the availability of judges and counsel.188 ConRict with 
hearsay rules and an emphasis on the adversarial process have also been 
o=ered as reasons for the failure to successfully and uniformly adopt prere-
corded evidence in some countries.189 
Prerecording the entirety of witnesses’ evidence may have varied practical 
results. It can sometimes ameliorate problems associated with stress and 
 
 182 See, eg, Eastwood and Patton, above n 14, 18–22. A study of the di=erent regimes for the 
introduction and use of prerecorded evidence is beyond the scope of this article. 
 183 Julianne Read and Martine Powell, ‘Investigative Interviewing of Child Sex O=ender 
Suspects: Strategies to Assist the Application of a Narrative Framework’ (2011) 8 Journal of 
Investigative Psychology and O!ender Pro(ling 163, 164. 
 184 Ibid 163–5.  
 185 See AIJA, Bench Book, above n 4, 100 [5.3].  
 186 See Evidence Act 2006 (NZ) s 105(1)(iii); Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (UK) c 46, 
ss 271A, 271I; Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (UK) c 23, s 28. In the United 
States, 38 of the 50 states have provisions to prerecord evidence: see Henderson, ‘Alternative 
Routes’, above n 15, 51, citing Laura Hoyano and Caroline Keenan, Child Abuse: Law and 
Policy Across Boundaries (Oxford University Press, 2010) 652. 
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delay,190 but this beneMt is not guaranteed. Complainants may still be required 
to testify at trial when new issues arise or new evidence becomes available, 
although this appears to happen rarely in practice.191 Further, prerecording 
may not remove the problem of developmentally inappropriate questioning 
and confusing language. Whether it will do so depends greatly upon the 
commitment of the judiciary to utilising the process to control cross-
examination. Although the absence of the jury should encourage this to 
occur,192 it may not always do so in practice. If judges adhere to the non-
interventionist stance traditionally maintained in the trial proper,193 then the 
process may o=er little scope to alleviate the problems of inappropriate cross-
examination. 
D  Intermediaries in Adversarial Systems 
;e role of a court-appointed intermediary is to reduce miscommunication 
and stress, and increase the comprehension of vulnerable witnesses.194 
Intermediary schemes take a variety of forms. 
1 ?e English Model 
In 1989, the Pigot Report recommended the use of a specialist interlocutor to 
relay questions to child witnesses.195 A scheme of this kind was rolled out 
nationally in 2008.196 In her most recent survey, Cooper notes that as of 23 
April 2012, there were 144 registered intermediaries on the register, and 
between September 2010 to August 2011, 1245 referrals to the service were 
accepted.197 
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;e intermediaries perform a variety of functions including translation 
and communication functions pre-trial and at trial, the preparation of reports 
for the courts about witnesses’ comprehension and communication capacities, 
appropriate styles of questioning and special facilities that they might need.198 
;e intermediary may sit with the witness in court and indicate to the court 
any questions that require rephrasing.199 Intermediaries undergo a training 
program before being placed on a national register.200 Intermediaries are 
usually assigned to witnesses by the court on the basis of their area of speciali-
sation.201 For example, they may have experience in dealing with people with 
down syndrome or autism.  
;e scheme has attracted judicial support202 but has produced mixed re-
sults in practice. ;e beneMts of the English intermediary scheme include 
better monitoring of counsel’s manner, the provision of assistance in the 
identiMcation of developmentally inappropriate questioning, identiMcation 
and implementation of measures to facilitate the giving of evidence.203 
However, inappropriate questioning continues to occur204 with consequent 
stress and confusion for vulnerable witnesses. Appropriate procedures and 
measures are not followed in approximately half of the instances where an 
intermediary is used.205 In her 2009 survey, Cooper suggested that ‘intermedi-
aries need to be very assertive to get judges and advocates to adopt best 
practice’.206 Getting others to adopt best practice remains a di8culty: in 2011, 
the majority of intermediaries who responded to Cooper’s survey said that the 
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‘ground rules’ agreed to before the hearing were breached in most or all of 
their trials.207 
2 ?e South African Model 
In contrast to the English intermediary scheme, the South African model 
a=ords intermediaries a more limited interpretive function. Usually, interme-
diaries sit in another room with the witness, and listen to questions from the 
prosecution and the defence (who are in the courtroom), through an ear-
piece before explaining them to witnesses.208 ;e court can observe the child, 
but the child cannot see or hear what is happening in the court.209 By translat-
ing or adapting questions, intermediaries reduce mistakes due to miscommu-
nication.210 ;e scheme has been praised as an e=ective means of improving 
children’s testimony.211 Moreover, even though the intermediary rephrases 
questions, this is not considered to undermine the fairness of the trial.212 
Versions of the scheme have been adopted in Namibia and Zimbabwe.213 
Initially there were di8culties in achieving consistent implementation of 
the scheme and, in particular, in determining who qualiMed for the assistance 
of an intermediary.214 As a result, the law was amended to allow persons aged 
under 18 years and witnesses under the ‘mental age of 18 years’ to use an 
intermediary.215 Further, courts are now required to give reasons for refusing 
to allow the use of intermediaries.216 However, the South African system still 
struggles on a practical level with problems arising from delays between the 
initial complaint and trials, a lack of electronic equipment to support the 
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scheme, insu8cient available training and unattractive work conditions, 
which make recruitment di8cult.217 
3 Within Australia 
Intermediaries have not been popular amongst Australian legislatures, with 
only two jurisdictions having intermediary-esque provisions. Western 
Australia has a provision allowing persons to act as a ‘communicator’ for child 
witnesses,218 which may allow for the involvement of a person similar to an 
intermediary. However, the section is yet to be subject to any judicial consid-
eration by superior courts, suggesting it may be rarely used.219 In New South 
Wales, there is also statutory provision for vulnerable persons to be assisted in 
giving evidence by a support person.220 As in Western Australia, it is not 
known to what extent this facility is used. However, there appears to be a view 
abroad that this provision relates to a person whose function is to provide 
nothing more than emotional support to the vulnerable witness, and does not 
extend to assisting the witnesses’ comprehension and communication of 
evidence.221 ;is limited view may mean that the full potential of the relevant 
provisions is not exploited. Yet quite clearly their wording allows for much 
greater assisted communication than mere emotional support. In this respect, 
the New South Wales provision can be contrasted with the South Australian 
equivalent which explicitly precludes a person from ‘interfer[ing] in the 
proceedings’.222  
Noting the overseas experience, barriers to the greater implementation of 
intermediary schemes in Australia could include the di8culty in ensuring the 
availability of intermediaries in remote and regional locations, the Mnancial 
implications of doing so, and problems in appointing and training su8cient 
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numbers of intermediaries to ensure equal access to them.223 Research has 
shown that intermediary schemes can improve the e=ective participation of 
children and witnesses with intellectual disabilities in the criminal justice 
process.224 Nevertheless, these schemes are not without problems and unless 
they are applied with su8cient rigour and understanding of their intent, they 
may not eliminate the problems of traditional cross-examination. Research on 
the English scheme in particular shows that where intermediaries are too 
tentative in fulMlling their interventionist task or where courts do not ade-
quately support and enforce their role in this regard with counsel, inappropri-
ate, unfair and misleading cross-examination will continue unabated.225  
;e reason for the non-utilisation of the intermediary-esque schemes 
legislated for in Western Australia and New South Wales is unclear. However, 
Judge Jackson notes that there is no recognised training course for ‘communi-
cators’ in Western Australia.226 ;is shows that it is not enough to legislate for 
such schemes. Unless they are adequately resourced and provision is made for 
the necessary infrastructure, they simply cannot operate. ;e discussion in 
this section suggests that the strengthening of intermediary schemes may be 
necessary if they are to achieve their full potential. SpeciMcally, what may be 
required is devolution of full responsibility for questioning to the intermedi-
ary and the removal of counsel from the process of direct questioning. ;is 
possibility is considered below. 
E  ?e Inquisitorial Approach 
;e adoption of some of the features of an inquisitorial system has been 
suggested as a solution to the problems that arise in the cross-examination of 
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vulnerable witnesses.227 ;ese approaches may help to alleviate some of the 
problems experienced by vulnerable witnesses which are so entrenched in the 
adversarial system. ;e mechanisms adopted for vulnerable witnesses in 
inquisitorial countries vary across jurisdictions. However, the approach that 
appears to o=er most beneMts for vulnerable witnesses is that used in Norway, 
which will be discussed in detail further below. Norway is also of particular 
interest as it has more in common with the adversarial system than some 
other fully inquisitorial jurisdictions.228 
Inquisitorial systems are based on the concept of inquiry rather than con-
test.229 ;e focus of inquisitorial systems is on extensive pre-trial investigation 
and evidence gathering processes, which are subject to extensive oversight 
from judicial o8cers as an evidential safeguard.230 ;is process rarely requires 
victims to testify at trial or to be cross-examined directly by defence counsel 
and yet it is considered to be fair to the defendant.231 ;e inquisitorial system 
aims to discover the truth through investigation. ;is is fundamentally 
distinct from the adversarial process, which is based on the assumption that 
the truth will best emerge from a partisan contest between two evenly 
matched competing sides232 (although this premise is o<en doubted in 
practice).233 
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Some commentators support a move beyond traditional adversarial cross-
examination to ensure fairness for all parties in the criminal justice process.234 
However, any call for a wholesale transformation to an inquisitorial process 
faces formidable obstacles. For example, the current South Australian 
Attorney-General, John Rau, noted that ‘it would be a very large step indeed 
to introduce an inquisitorial court process for determination of criminal 
matters’ and that such a development would give rise to ‘a huge number of 
philosophical and practical issues’.235 It has been argued that a ‘change to an 
inquisitorial system, even if it could be shown to be desirable, would be so 
fundamental in its e=ect upon institutions that had taken centuries to build as 
to be impossible on political and practical grounds’.236 Indeed, for Sir Antho-
ny Mason, the adoption of an inquisitorial system would be an ‘extraordinary 
act of faith’: 
It would be contrary to our traditions and culture, it would generate massive 
opposition, and it would call for expertise that we do not presently possess and 
at the end of the day we would have a new system without a demonstrated cer-
tainty that it would be superior to our own.237 
It has been suggested that increasingly the common law legal system is 
adopting ‘non-adversarial’ elements.238 ;is trend is most evident in the civil 
jurisdiction,239 but is also evident in such developments as comprehensive 
pre-trial criminal case management240 and the advent of therapeutic justice 
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models and specialised ‘problem solving’ criminal courts.241 Nevertheless, the 
view remains that the common law criminal trial is ‘the purest expression of 
the adversary system’.242 Australian criminal trials will not readily be trans-
formed into an inquisitorial process. ;is does not mean, however, that it 
cannot be improved. Accordingly, it is suggested that there is one aspect of the 
Norwegian system that might be introduced in Australia for the beneMt of 
vulnerable witnesses without disturbing the essential characteristics of the 
adversarial trial — the use of trained interviewers to elicit the entirety of the 
testimony of vulnerable witnesses. 
Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Act (Norway) sets out the procedure 
for the examination of vulnerable witnesses in ‘cases of sexual felonies or 
misdemeanours’ or ‘other criminal matters when the interests of the witness 
so indicate’.243 ;e vulnerable witness is either assisted by a ‘well-qualiMed 
person’ in the examination, or the examination is conducted by the ‘well-
qualiMed person subject to the judge’s control’.244 ‘Well-qualiMed’ persons are 
trained in best practice procedures for eliciting complete and accurate 
evidence.245 ;e interview is linked by video to the judge, prosecution and 
defence lawyers in another room.246 A<er the interviewer takes a comprehen-
sive account of the events, the judge, prosecution and defence counsel, who 
watch via CCTV link, have the opportunity to ask the interviewer to put 
further questions on their behalf to the witness.247 ;ey do not devise the 
precise questions to be asked or put questions directly to the witness. ;is 
process is repeated until all the parties are satisMed that su8cient evidence has 
been taken and adequately scrutinised. ;e video of the interview can then be 
accepted in court as the totality of the evidence, with no need for the child to 
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attend or be cross-examined.248A complainant is usually referred for treat-
ment and support following the interview.249 In contrast to programs that 
utilise intermediaries as quasi-interpreters or that give them an interventionist 
role to ensure the appropriateness of questions asked, trained interviewers in 
Norway have the principal responsibility for eliciting evidence from vulnera-
ble witnesses, rather than ultimate control remaining in the hands of counsel. 
Further, in part due to the interview being overseen by judge, prosecution and 
defence, this mode of questioning does not appear to have given rise to any 
internal conRict in the interviewer’s role in eliciting su8cient evidence for 
both the defence and prosecution.250 As Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers 
and Rotherham note, in this way, ‘Norway retains the essential two-party 
nature of the adversarial proceeding’.251 Moreover, because the aim is to elicit 
as much accurate and reliable evidence as possible from the witness and to do 
so in a way that avoids the problems generated by traditional cross-
examination, there is no need for interviewers to assume di=ering stances or 
roles (pro-prosecution or pro-defence) during questioning. ;is may assist in 
avoiding any potentially negative implications for witnesses, were such a 
change in role to occur. 
;e process used in Norway must ‘be carried out no later than two weeks 
a<er the criminal o=ence has been reported to the police, unless special 
reasons indicate that the examination … should be carried out later’.252 A<er 
the initial interview, it is very rare for a child to be re-interviewed.253 ;is 
obviates the need for events to be recounted to multiple people over many 
months as may occur in Australia. Because of the immediacy and lack of 
repetition of this process, it is more likely to elicit accurate testimony, which 
will in turn help prosecutors and the defence to make appropriate decisions 
about the case. ;e process also promotes faster recovery for complainants 
because of the early conclusion of their involvement in the trial. Additionally, 
it prevents the defence from attempting to exploit a witness’s vulnerability in 
order to advance the defence case. 
;is system for the cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses could po-
tentially be introduced in an adversarial system. In order for this process to be 
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implemented in Australia, it must satisfy the legitimate goals that cross-
examination is designed to achieve. ;is means that it must provide adequate 
opportunity for the defendant to challenge the content and credibility of 
prosecution witnesses’ testimony. In this regard, the Norwegian process allows 
extensive questioning to occur at the behest of either party. It is for this reason 
that the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that a similar Swedish 
procedure does not violate a defendant’s right to examine a witness and is 
consistent with a fair trial. In SN v Sweden,254 the European Court of Human 
Rights held that there had been no breach of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which provides that a defendant has a right to ‘examine or have 
examined witnesses against him’.255 ;at case involved a sexual assault on a 
10-year-old boy. ;e boy was interviewed twice by police and his recorded 
interviews were played at trial. Defence counsel had been permitted to test the 
complainant’s evidence by putting questions to him through the interviewing 
police o8cer. It was held that this procedure provided the defence with 
adequate opportunity to comment on the boy’s credibility and to challenge his 
account. ;e trial was found to be fair.256 ;e European Court of Human 
Rights highlighted the ‘special features’ of trials involving sexual o=ences and 
noted that  
in criminal proceedings concerning sexual abuse certain measures may be tak-
en for the purpose of protecting the victim, provided that such measures can  
be reconciled with an adequate and e=ective exercise of the rights of the  
defence.257 
;e Constitutional Court of South Africa has similarly accepted that put-
ting questions indirectly to a witness is consistent with a fair trial.258 ;e 
process in Norway has the additional advantage that confusion, inconsistency 
and loss of memory are likely to be reduced by taking one comprehensive 
account soon a<er the initial complaint is made rather than by requiring 
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possibly repeated accounts to be made to di=erent people on di=erent 
occasions.259  
A similar recommendation has featured in Cossins’ work on di=erent 
possible models for prosecuting child sex o=ences in Australia. Cossins 
Ragged four options of this type: 
 (i) … the use of a court-appointed intermediary to assess cross-examination 
questions to ensure that they are not improper and are able to be understood by 
the child complainant with regard to her/his age and cognitive development; 
 (ii) the communication of pre-prepared questions by the defence via a court-
appointed and trained intermediary who would then put the questions to the 
child in age-appropriate language. …; 
 (iii) right of appearance of a complainant’s legal representative who would have the 
right to vet and to object to improper and age-inappropriate questions; or 
 (iv) placing control of the conduct of cross-examination in the trial judge using the 
Family Court Children’s Cases Pilot Project as a model.260 
None of these options, however, recommend removing counsel from the 
questioning process to the extent evident in the Norwegian process. Rather, 
Cossins envisages the intermediary’s role as more closely aligned to models 
that assign them a predominantly interpretive function. 
One potential barrier to the implementation in an adversarial system of a 
Norwegian-esque process is the investigation-based structure of the inquisito-
rial system in which it is essentially grounded. In the adversarial system, the 
contents of an investigative interview may not be admissible at trial, and a 
separate evidential interview may be required. In contrast to adversarial 
systems, the system in Norway, for example, does not draw any distinction 
between investigative and evidential interviews; there is just one forensic 
investigative interview for vulnerable witnesses. ;is problem might be 
overcome by retaining the initial investigative interview and then conducting 
the evidential examination shortly therea<er. ;is would accord with process-
es for prerecording evidence currently in operation in Western Australia. 
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As with prerecorded evidence, there are obvious logistical obstacles to 
implementing a process for conducting early evidential interviews with 
intermediaries. ;ese include problems associated with the subsequent 
discovery of fresh evidence, the availability of adequate training for specialist 
interviewers, and the defendants’ possible lack of opportunity to instruct or 
obtain legal representation prior to the interview. In Australia, lawyers from 
the Legal Services Commission or Public Defenders Service could be specially 
trained and made available to represent the interests of defendants at eviden-
tial interviews. Indeed, in some cases in Norway, a state-appointed lawyer 
represents the interests of the accused during the interview.261 Implementa-
tion in Australian jurisdictions of an expert interviewing process akin to that 
used in Norway could resolve those problems in cross-examination that 
appear to be resistant to other mechanisms currently deployed to aid the 
reception of reliable evidence vulnerable witnesses. In particular, it o=ers the 
potential to strengthen current intermediary schemes and pre-trial recording 
processes. 
VI  RECOMMENDATIONS  
;e process of interviewing used in Norway would be likely to improve the 
quality of evidence and the trial process for a child or complainant with an 
intellectual disability. Although measures such as greater adherence to best 
practice guidelines, enhanced training, English-style intermediaries and the 
prerecording of evidence can be very useful, they do not appear to be su8-
cient to eliminate the underlying problems associated with cross-examining 
vulnerable witnesses in an adversarial system. Instead, removing direct 
questions and accusations from both the prosecution and defence lawyers and 
entrusting that role to an independent, trained, Norwegian-style interviewer 
has the potential to ensure fairness for all parties. In order to elicit more 
accurate testimony, reduce the trauma associated with testifying and, most 
importantly, not compromise fairness to defendants, this article advocates and 
supports recommendations that examination-in-chief and cross-examination 
of children and witnesses with intellectual disabilities should be replaced by 
separate evidential and investigative interviews conducted by expert inter-
viewers who have received specialist training: 
• Evidential Interview — As soon as practicable, a<er the prosecution has 
completed disclosure of its case, a video-recorded evidential interview with 
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a child witness or complainant with an intellectual disability should take 
place. ;is should be conducted by an interviewer with specialist 
knowledge of the comprehension and communication di8culties of chil-
dren and witnesses with intellectual disabilities. ;e evidential interview 
should replace the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of these 
witnesses at trial. ;e defendant and prosecution should be able to submit 
questions to the interviewer as occurs in Norway. ;e option for further 
examination in the event that new material evidence emerges must remain 
a possibility but should be avoided and occur only exceptionally.  
• Investigative Interview — An initial investigative interview with a properly 
trained interviewer should take place as soon as possible a<er the alleged 
o=ence. ;is interview should be recorded and it is essential that record-
ings show the witness’s face, full expression and demeanour. ;e option 
should exist for parts or even the entirety of the investigative interview to 
be played at trial in addition to the evidential interview. ;e investigative 
interviewer should be qualiMed to identify aspects of complainants’ vulner-
ability that may a=ect their capacity to comprehend questions and com-
municate answers. ;e interviewer should also be able to recommend the 
use of special measures to assist these witnesses in giving their evidence. 
;is would allow subtleties of youth or intellectual disability to be identi-
Med and addressed. ;is role would overlap with some of the duties of the 
English intermediary described above.  
VII  CONCLUSION  
;e testing and challenging of the testimony of a witness in cross-examination 
is regarded as an integral aspect of the adversarial criminal trial. However, 
cross-examination can lead to inaccurate and unreliable evidence when the 
complainant is a child or person with an intellectual disability. ;is is because 
the nature of cross-examination, the adversarial tactics used, the language and 
phrasing of questions, and the delay between complaint and examination 
inevitably combine to reduce the ability of these witnesses to give reliable and 
cogent evidence. Little can be done to improve the quality of evidence 
adduced from vulnerable complainants while traditional adversarial cross-
examination continues. Current practice may grant the defence an unfair 
advantage that could undermine the community’s faith in the criminal justice 
process. Empirical studies, law reform reports, judicial commentary and 
recent case law all support the need for change.  
It is not simple but it is, nevertheless, possible in the cross-examination of 
vulnerable witnesses to balance the triangulation of interests of defendant, 
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witness and society and to ensure a fair trial for all. ;e greater use of prere-
corded testimony, further education and training for judges and lawyers, 
greater adherence to best practice guidelines, and the use of English style 
intermediaries may not operate as silver bullets in the solution of the prob-
lems identiMed in this article, but they can contribute to that solution. 
Nevertheless, in order to obtain the best evidence from, and signiMcantly 
improve the process of testifying for, vulnerable witnesses, something more is 
needed. Defence lawyers should not be allowed to directly cross-examine 
either children or witnesses with intellectual disabilities. Rather, a process 
involving a recorded investigative and a recorded evidential interview (which 
would include any questions to be put by either the prosecution or defence) 
through an independent, qualiMed questioner, similar to the Norwegian 
system, should be introduced.  
It is essential that the testing of the evidence of children and complainants 
with intellectual disabilities be reformed to ensure their full and fair participa-
tion in the trial process. ;is would not deny fair trials to defendants or 
involve a wholesale transition to an inquisitorial system. Current adversarial 
cross-examination promotes unjust outcomes and gives an illegitimate 
advantage to defendants. It therefore denies justice to, and endorses inequality 
before the law for, children and people with intellectual disabilities. ;ere  
are many di8culties vulnerable witnesses must face in the criminal justice 
process, but unfair and discriminatory cross-examination need not be one  
of them. 
